I am almost always reading one philosophy book or another ever
since I first read Will Durant’s The
Story of Philosophy, which, whenever that was, was a long time ago. It is
possible that I read Plato or Spinoza before that or at the same time as a freshman
in college. I just can’t remember anymore. But before I ever read philosophy, I
was a philosopher of sorts, however uninformed or juvenile my thoughts may have
been, since at least second grade. What I mean by that is that it was my
impression – still my impression - that I thought about things such why the
universe is as it is, why people believed what they did, should we blindly
follow traditions, was there a God or gods, why do people argue as they did -
more than other people seem to do to me. Even today, though there are certainly
many others who do the same, it is not all that common. Perhaps it led me to be somewhat unorthodox,
in that I didn’t believe things just because my parents said so or because they
were popular. The first of these issues, to my memory, was atheism, hardly
popular and not what my parents were pushing either.
However, I foolishly resisted reading philosophers once I
knew there actually were such people, so that I would not be tainted by their
thoughts and my philosophy would be purely mine. Of course that was ridiculous
as I was a product of my environment to some degree like everyone else and it
merely restricted me to the views of a small group of people I knew or read.
I have a deep interest in science as well, but more so the
history of science and theoretical issues about science itself. Science I see as a subset of philosophy,
however, it is often the case, particularly in modern society, that the tail
wags the dog between the two. Science is for me the best method we have of
understanding what is real or not of those things that are testable, however slow
and imperfect it might be. However, it is not possible without philosophy, that
is, at least epistemology – how we know what we know – and logic, the rules of
reason without which we cannot assign truth or false to any propositions. As
for metaphysics, which concerns things like being and reality, I do not reject
it as completely meaningless as some philosophers do, but I do not think we
have sufficient means to say much about its main questions – why is there
anything and what is its essence? And, sometimes, metaphysics is indistinguishable
from epistemology (how do we know what we know). It depends on how you frame
the question.
As I get older, I read fewer philosophers directly (some of
them are just so hard to get through and there is a lot of gibberish), and read
more books about them or their theories by scholars who separate the chaff from
the wheat for us. Here’s a list, probably partial, of some of the philosophers
I’ve read directly in some depth, leaving aside those theologians others might
consider philosophers, but who I do not consider sufficiently so (roughly but
not quite in chronological order):
·
Lao-Tze supposedly wrote the Tao te Ching with which I am in at least
theoretical sympatica; I include him
knowing that he did not likely exist; Who cares? The book exists, probably
written over time collecting like thoughts forming a very early philosophy
which still exists.
· Confucius. I’ve actually read a very compelling
book arguing that he did not exist either, though he is more often believed to
be an actual person; the ostensible creators were actually Christian
missionaries to China a couple of millennium after he was thought to have lived.
Plato. This is as close as we can get to
Socrates. We don't really know either when Socrates is really speaking through him and when it is purely Plato or some combination. It has been said that all philosophy is commentary on Plato, and
while it is an exaggeration, it is not hard to understand why it is believed.
· Aristotle was in some senses, the most
significant of all Greek writers for us, along with Homer, who again probably
did not exist, and Plato. The breadth of Aristotle's knowledge and expertise (even where
he was completely wrong) is remarkable.
· Thomas Aquinas. I read him to no great advantage
but he is historically important.
·
Epictetus. He’s not that well known to the
general public. He was a stoic; we have some aphorisms, many of which pass the
test of time, even if at the same being more to aspire to rather than live
fully.
·
Marcus Aurelius was a stoic emperor; again, what
we have is very aphoristic but often wise.
· William of Ockham (or Occam). He is best known for a single
statement he never wrote, but which was a logical expansion of what he did write; however, it is
relatively unknown that he also played a role in the great march of freedom. I’ve
only read him recently and had to go to a university library to do so. These aren't exactly bestsellers.
·
Bacon. The Elizabethian Aristotle. This British
philosopher is not only great fun; but he was also capable of great wisdom. I
have more than one copy of his essays (possibly three – one a gift) and I pick
it up and read it all the time.
·
Spinoza. I have to date not made up my mind
about the value of his philosophy, however original, brilliant, etc., he was; nevertheless, his influence cannot be doubted. Although much of what he wrote was
really a commentary and in imitation of Descartes, I’ve never read but a few
pages of Descartes directly and leave him off my list. Much of Spinoza also seems to me derivative of the ideas of Plato and Aristotle. I'm sure that every philosophy can be shown to have been derived from others in some way, but, I think Spinoza might . . . I say might . . . be given more credit than he deserves.
·
Locke. Also, a highly influential person in
politics and psychology and certainly an inspiration to the founding class in
America.
·
Berkeley. George Berkeley’s exploration of the
nature of reality is much overlooked, easy to criticize, but also prescient of
modern physics. What’s underneath it all – nothing?
·
Hume is my favorite philosopher; leave aside his
not surprising views on non-whites which is sometimes used to discredit him; he
is in my view, the most influential philosopher in the west since the Greeks.
More so than Spinoza, Kant and even Descartes.
·
Kant. Feel free to try, but he is largely unreadable
and we are all much better off with a summary, which some other writers will
tell you is a mistake.
·
James Madison - to the extent that The
Federalist Papers and other writings are political philosophy.
·
Alexander Hamilton – again, to the extent that
The Federalist Papers are political philosophy.
·
Schopenhauer. Sometimes a nutty guy (try his
views on women), he was a preview and more understandable version of Nietzsche;
but also a gateway to eastern philosophy.
·
Nietzsche. I appreciate some aspects of his
philosophy, but much of it is incomprehensible to me and as much poetry and
fictional as philosophy.
·
Lord Acton. He was a proto-libertarian mostly
famous these days for a statement in a letter which is now misquoted as – Power
corrupts. Absolute power corrupts absolutely, or some such version.
·
Emerson. The father of American philosophy, he
did not excite me the way Thoreau did, but certainly he was Thoreau’s mentor;
he did not create the tag Transcendentalism for his loose group, but whatever
linked that group, he was undoubtedly the leader.
·
Thoreau. I’ve written several posts on him; he
was one of the three greatest American writers in my view and I am not sure
whether he influenced me directly or I just found him to be the philosopher who
most closely matched my own opinion. Surely though, many of my own thoughts mirror
or are very consistent with his and that is undoubtedly gratifying for me as I
greatly admire him. Or is it that I greatly admire myself and therefore think I
admire someone who agrees with me? Maybe, but he was such a great writer, I am
not worthy to sharpen his pencils.
· Charles Peirce. If you haven’t heard of him (and
that’s likely), it is because he was disgraced over adultery and slandered. An original American
philosopher and scientist little known in his time or ours, but very important - hard to exaggerate in fact,
particularly in logic and epistemology and he is having a bit of a renaissance. Although on some subjects he is crystal clear, on some he is impenetrable, including pragmatism and semiotics, both topics which he founded. His fallibilism, which described the process of modern science, long preceded Popper, often thought of as the father of modern science theory.
·
Bertrand Russell. Perhaps the easiest of all to
read and pretty much a poly-math; he wrote one of the two best summaries of philosophy,
Durant’s being the other, that I’ve read and also authored endless books and
pamphlets on a myriad of philosophical topics.
·
Einstein. I consider him a philosopher as well as
a theoretical scientist because he probably went further in explaining the
nature of the universe than anyone else; I’m still working on relativity and will be for the next 100 years, or shorter, if I can do so while traveling at
the speed of light.
·
Heidegger. Oh . . . my . . . God – I tortured
myself reading him as a young man and I don’t think I ever understood it. I
tried. I tried. I think I read Being and
Time. He was also a Nazi, but, I tried to get past that too if he had something
worthwhile to say. I do not, in the end, think he is influential.
· A. J. Ayers, Russell’s biographer and a very
knowledgeable philosopher himself, but I believe with little important to say
himself and capable of writing some of the most convoluted prose I’ve ever read.*
I feel compelled to quote Ayer, just because I find it so funny: "For, roughly speaking, all that we are saying when we say that the mental state of a person A at a time t is a a state of awareness of a material thing X, is that the sense-experience which is the element of A occurring at a time t contains a sense-content which is an element of X, and also certain images which define A's expectation of the occurrence in suitable circumstances of certain further elements of X, and that this expectation is correct: and what we are saying when we assert that a mental object M and a physical object X are causally connected is that, in certain conditions, the occurrence of a certain sort of sense-content, which is an element of M, is a reliable sign of the occurrence of a certain sort of sense-content, which is an element of X, or vice versa, [a]nd the question whether any propositions of these kinds are true or not is clearly an empirical question." Oy vey.
I feel compelled to quote Ayer, just because I find it so funny: "For, roughly speaking, all that we are saying when we say that the mental state of a person A at a time t is a a state of awareness of a material thing X, is that the sense-experience which is the element of A occurring at a time t contains a sense-content which is an element of X, and also certain images which define A's expectation of the occurrence in suitable circumstances of certain further elements of X, and that this expectation is correct: and what we are saying when we assert that a mental object M and a physical object X are causally connected is that, in certain conditions, the occurrence of a certain sort of sense-content, which is an element of M, is a reliable sign of the occurrence of a certain sort of sense-content, which is an element of X, or vice versa, [a]nd the question whether any propositions of these kinds are true or not is clearly an empirical question." Oy vey.
·
Sartre. If I ever pick up Being and Nothingness
again, it will be as a paper weight – I couldn’t get far; but I do enjoy his
fiction and some of his essays. I know just enough about him to say that I disagree
with most everything he has to say.
·
Wittgenstein. The anti-Popper in some senses;
they can probably be described as personal enemies; Wittgenstein was not an
easy person to get along with; despite his meager published writings; he was a
deep and original thinker and is still influential.
·
Popper. As with Hayek below; not surprisingly, these
two Austrians were friends. Popper is considered the great philosopher of
science and his epistemology is very dominant now. Some of it I think a little
crazy. Other parts brilliant. I much prefer his political philosophy, and The
Open Society and its Enemies is one of the last century's greatest non-fiction
works.
·
Hayek, who I probably have read more from
directly than any of the others is, along with Popper, the writer I have
learned the most from about why I actually believe as I do. In other words, I've found that they provide a deep basis with great scholarship for things I've concluded with much less evidence. The Road to Serfdom is Hayek's most famous
work, although I believe little read by those who celebrate it; I found his Constitution of Liberty, similar in
nature, more complete and important, though it is now virtually unread by
anyone.
Others of the above philosophers are as unreadable as Ayer,
particularly some of those discussing metaphysics like Heidegger, Sartre and Kant,
and not just because they are translations. Admittedly, many of the easiest
philosophers for us to read wrote in English. However, some translations are
very good and it is not hard to read English translations of Plato or Aquinas,
Occam (who though English wrote in Latin), Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, Hayek or
Popper among others. Sometimes it is the writer, not the translator.
But, I do not consider that above listed group of philosophers to be the
best source of my philosophical knowledge. Many philosophers that I have found
fascinating or important cannot be read in the original, if they even existed.
From the east, the Buddha (who, again, likely did not exist) and the sages of
the Vedas or all important to me. From ancient Greek, the some of the
pre-Socratics like Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Heraclitus,
Xenophanes, Parmenides, Zeno, Leucippus and Democritus made contributions still
resonating today. Arguably, we are what we are in the west today to a large
extent because of their philosophical investigations, even if we never heard of
them. Other than Epictetus, I have not read of whatever little is available of
the stoics like Zeno, Chrysippus or Seneca, but enough in general works to feel
that I know what they believed, their strengths and weaknesses. I could make a
long list of other philosophers of whom I have read a little bit or summaries
of their work, but I don’t see it as important. What feels important to me is
that I feel satisfied that I have learned sufficiently, because you can never
learn perfectly or about everything. I
never stop reading or learning, but, my philosophy is generally my own, to some
degree formed before I read Durant.
Does all this reading philosophy do me any good in life? I’m not sure.
But, I take what I want from them and exclude the rest without any problem. I
have known some people who stopped reading philosophy because it depressed
them. Russell wrote in one of my favorite of his philosophical works, Unpopular Essays, “[c]ommentators on great
philosophers always politely ignore their silly remarks,” but that shouldn’t
stop us. Don’t let it detract from wisdom where it strikes you true.
There are three pre-eminent reasons to read philosophy in my mind (I’m
sure we could all come up with others) – First, because you teach or write
about philosophy, which has to account for the smallest group, almost not worth
mentioning. Second, because you are
determined to understand yourself and/or the universe better and believe it
helps you do so. Third, because you feel it adds to the happiness in your life.
With myself it is a mix of the latter two. One could argue that two is a subset
of three anyway, and perhaps it is. But, while “learning” gives me
satisfaction, there is definitely some internal pleasure I get from reading
philosophy separate and apart from learning anything about the subject. It
feels good, often better than it does with most novels I have read. I can recognize the difference between the
gratification of learning from philosophy and the gratification that is
separate and apart from it easily enough because I find the same dichotomy, although greater, with
theology. I do not read theology at all to educate myself, but only for
pleasure. Why it gives me pleasure to read someone trying to explain something
I am not likely to believe, I can’t say. But, it tells me there is a difference
between the pleasure of learning something specific and the pleasure in learning what someone or group believes whether I believe it or not.
I suppose that if
wanted to (and had the time and money) I could write thousands of pages on my
philosophical beliefs, because just commenting on what others have written would
amount to hundreds if not thousands of pages (I have hundreds and possibly thousands
of pages of notes from books I’ve read and limit it only because there is no
great purpose to it). Fear not, I have no intention of writing all that here
and I have already squandered about half my self-limited post on these
preliminaries words anyway. I have not given the following a lot of thought as
to how to present it and don’t plan on even mentioning many philosophers.
Rather, I will just put it out there unadorned (after all, the sub-title of
this blog is, My thoughts, what else?).
And just as I couldn’t be comprehensive in a thousand pages, don’t expect it in
a few. In fact, because philosophy is so broad – even excluding the ridiculous
discussion of aesthetics – I am going to concentrate on one – my favorite, epistemology
and save the others for another day.
Epistemology
The center of my
philosophy is also probably the thing that irritates my evalovin’ gf the most –
I say I don’t know a lot. And though often enough I throw out a
guess about things in answering her or others,* I notice that with respect to
most questions, I’m perfectly comfortable saying I don’t know when I think I don’t. One of my earliest memories of
any kind of philosophical discussions was my mother telling me that Socrates
said that he was wisest because he knew that he knew nothing. My own research
much later tells me that Plato never actually puts these precise words into
Socrates’ mouth, but something vaguer and harder to translate into English.
But, it wouldn’t matter if my mom was the first to say it because it’s the
thought that counts. In reading philosophy, I find that I am most attracted to
those who explain why we don’t know things or how irrational we can be, rather
than those who think they know, but always fall far short when pressed even a
little. Most of our beliefs or actions in life have to be based on some level
of faith that reason can exist, that there are “things” in the world and it
isn’t all an illusion or a misperception, but the most unsatisfactory answers
are those which rely on faith for complex solutions, usually religious answers.
*Another silly story - I was walking through a mansion/museum I had been to many times before with a friend who rented the tape you play into ear phones as you walk around. We came to a great big rectangular room with a hard wooden floor, easily the biggest room in the place. She said, "What room is this?" I answered without hesitation "The ballroom." She hit the button on the tape and cracked up. She re-wound, gave me the ear phones and played what she had heard - "No, this is not the ballroom."
Coupled with I don’t
know is a second principle, which is I
don’t care. By that I mean that our inability to know virtually anything
shouldn’t stop us from taking some things for granted or doing anything in life
without some other good reason (like it is dangerous). And, not knowing
generally only bothers philosophers. In real life, no one else cares that much.
Things that we are used to or which seem overwhelming obvious or highly
unlikely to be a fantasy, we ignore not knowing the whys and wherefores of it.
Hume said something like this in dealing with inductive knowledge, that is,
what we know through experience. As he explained, you can never take what
happened before (experience) to mean something is going to happen again. I hear
this argument all the time when arguing with people and consider it vastly
overused. While it is technically true, it is virtually useless except in doing
science or having abstract discussions about whether we can ever know anything. What I find is that people use it as a last ditch argument to avoid coming to
common sense conclusions they don’t want to believe based on the best evidence
or arguments. But, since Hume’s problem of induction is technically true, the
only way to handle it is to not care. If we accept we can’t know anything,
there is simply no reason to do anything. For Descartes it may have been
sufficient to believe only in his own existence because it was all he could
know without doubt. Maybe it’s true. But, if you look at his doubts of other
matters that seem pretty certain to all of us on a day to day basis, based on
the highly unlikely possibility they may be created as an illusion by a demon,
it is pretty hard to take him seriously if you just want something to eat. In a
sense, Hume’s inductive problem is the same thing as Descartes determination
not to believe true anything we have doubts about. Just as Hume also said that
we are crazy to worry about the inductive problem in real life, we are also crazy
also to let the existence of any doubt overtake our common sense or to believe
the only thing we can know is that we ourselves exist. Almost everything we do
in life is based on our prior experience (sometimes aided by our instincts) or
things we must have at least minimal doubts about. We get out of bed in the
morning not knowing for absolute sure if the floor will be there or collapse
under us. But, we do not hesitate. If we did, we’d be called mentally ill. We
speak to people all day long knowing that they are not supernatural chameleons
changing identities, eat food knowing it will nourish us, and so on until infinity.
Doubts do come to us, but that is just part of life. And some things we doubt to a degree that we say - I just don’t know, and other things so much that we say - I don't believe it.
Where do we draw the line between things we doubt so much we
don’t believe them, things we think might be so but aren’t sure about (that is,
some doubt), and those things we can’t be sure about but are sufficiently so
that we either believe them true or don’t even think about? I have to fall back
now on the first principle. I don’t know.
Our cognitive scientists don’t know how the mind works sufficiently and I sure
don’t know either. When I studied (I will politely call it that) psychology in
college, it was mostly all theory then. And though brain science is
skyrocketing since functional mri machines and other technological tools have
opened up venues unknown a couple of decades ago, the science is still in its
infancy, despite carloads of new data. Only when an understanding of how our
memory works – without which knowledge is impossible – can we hope to have a
clue. And until then, I fall back on my second principle – I don’t care. Because our memory works and we obtain knowledge every
day without knowing how the process works since time immemorial.
However, I have not written all this clap trap to just say I don’t know and I don’t care, which sounds suspiciously like an Abbot and Costello
routine and gets you nowhere. There is a third principle which gets us where we
need to be – able to tell the difference between different levels of doubt such
that we can say we don’t know, we might know and we do know. This revolutionary
theory, is actually the same as my theory of what makes a group of symbols a
word – the principle of enough.
As to the question of why certain symbols are words and
others not, I believe the answer is when a word is determined to be so by enough people, and that judgment is
subject to time and place and to a lesser degree - individuals. If this seems
simplistic, it’s not. It is actually taking into account how complex the language
is and how to explain subjective phenomena that we seem to recognize as real
and want to differentiate (like some symbols being words and others not) but that
can’t be measured or explained with numbers or traditional measurements. That
using the concept of enough (you
could call it a tipping point or even something scientific sounding) sounds
folksy or simple does not make it wrong.
It is relatively the same with deciding between levels of
doubt – what we know or don’t know - as with deciding what is a word. It might
seem at first blush that answering the question of whether a group of symbols
is a word is a social question because communication between people can be
involved, and it might also seem that knowledge is more a personal matter. But,
in truth, both are mixed. Words are used to communicate with ourselves as well
as with others. In fact, we think much more than we talk to ourselves. As for
knowledge, much of it is communal. So much of what we think we know, we do so
because we have been told by others it is so and have no personal experience of
it at all. We are all sure that Pluto – planet or planetoid – is out there.
Have we seen it? We all believe that the bump bump in our chest is a heart?
We’ve heard it, but have we seen it? Some people have considered the workings
of the circulatory system, and yet unless they do surgery for a living, in most
cases everything they think about it comes from another person, even if found
in a book. But most of us never even really give a thought to how our
circulatory system works. We’ve been told we have a heart, have seen pictures
of it, and take it for granted it is so. Why do we believe that?
The answer is, because of the rule of enough.
We have enough information we trust to believe it is true and not reasonably
doubt it even if we acknowledge that anything is possible, and maybe even that
everyone could be wrong (as often happens). But, generally we don’t do that. We
just feel we know. Or if you prefer, we just believe it.
And by enough – I
do not mean only that we’ve heard it enough, or that there was enough supporting information or that it
was logical enough. It would include enough information from any other source
that would tend to lessen our doubt or support our belief including those which
are logically fallacies – such as when we learn information from someone or
something we consider an authority.
Just to make sure we are on the same page, when I ask the
question of when we can say we have knowledge, I do not also mean to ask by it - when
can we know something is real or true. Our knowledge is based on what we
think is true or real and we may be completely wrong. If we learn we were wrong
about a belief or fact, it merely means that we now have increased our level of
doubt, or do not have enough
certainty to believe we have knowledge.
That’s it on epistemology. Just writing this last sentence I
thought of a few other avenues I could go down, but I think it’s enough except
for the summary of my epistemology. To some, this may seem too simple. Simple
was my goal, not some high fallutin’ sounding gobbledy-gook. And, if you take a
look at something considered profound, such as Plato’s allegory of the cave, it
is very simplistic itself. And, you would be surprised how many philosophers would disagree with what I've written.